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The purpose of this explication is to highlight the background of 
post-truth as a viewpoint, namely some of the sources and 
conditions from which it possible emerged. Based on the 
controversial philosophical developments in general, and 
especially those of the philosophy of science of the 20th century, 
which are continuing to this day, the argumentation will reckon, 
on the one hand, the viewpoint of verificationism, according to 
which scientific theories are confirmed if the reference of their 
prediction is ascertained and scientists have to verify them; as 
well as, on the other hand, the viewpoint of falsificationism, 
according to which all scientific theories are false and scientists 
have to falsify them. The elaboration will be expanded, including 
the contributions of Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul 
Feyerabend, as well as others. The findings of the philosophy of 
science that the theories of science are false, that theory have an 
impact on the formation of facts and perceptions, that the 
dichotomy of facts / values are collapsed, etc., reveal how 
perhaps the path to post-truth was paved. The explication will 
be realized through the theoretical approach, the examination of 
for and coins arguments and analysis to achieve the conclusion 
that the post-truth as a point of view could emerge as an indirect 
consequence of developments in philosophy in general and 
especially in philosophy of science. 
Keywords: post-truth, philosophy, philosophy of science, 
verificationism, falsificationism 
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Introduction 
 
In this paper post-truth1, although there is still no author who 
theoretically has elaborated aiming to establish it, it is considered 
as a viewpoint, also as an approach and as a different way of 
thinking, as a line of judgment and assessment, as a style of 
communication and expression; it has already taken some 
contour, and will certainly continue to be profiled and clarified 
even more in different spheres. The objective is to examine the 
sources and conditions that, unintentionally, paved the way for 
the perception of post-truth as a concept and as a point of view. 
The approach here will be focused on some development of the 
philosophy of science which has created, without any prior 
intention, the conditions that made possible the post-truth 
outlook. Of course, this intellectual product cannot be attributed 
exclusively to the philosophy of science, since the greatest merits 
have its mother - philosophy.2 
The structure of the paper will start by describing some 
purport aspects that characterize post-truth as a point of view, 
showing its meaning. It will continue with the philosophy, 
presenting the tensions and mutual undermined point of views 
that were considered as true. More attention will be devoted to 
what may have led to the decisive shaking of the conception of 
truth: the philosophy of science, where will be presented the 
viewpoint of verificationism that put the truth in the epicenter of 
                                                     
1 On November 16, 2016, Oxford Dictionaries announced the post-truth as the 
words of year 2016. This shows, of course, only one thing, that this concept 
has attracted attention and has become so widespread that it represents an 
approach already manifested. At https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-
the-year/word-of-the-year-2016, seen on November 20 2017. 
2 On the impact of politics and technological development on the emergence 
and spread of the post-truth, see Hajdin Abazi, “Substantial transformation: 
Post-Truth in Today's Media”, included in proceedings of Second 
International Conference on Communication and Media Studies entitled 
“Media History and Media Transformations” held on September 23, AAB 
College, Pristine. 2017. 
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development as a measure of scientific progress, and the 
viewpoint of falsificationism that shows the impossibility of 
reaching the truth and as an alternative brings falsification as the 
epicenter of the scientific progress. Then there will be put 
forward some conceptual aspects that show the truth is not so 
immune and self-evident as it is claimed, but it is influenced and 
perhaps even produced by theories. Thus, it will be shown how 
the philosophy of science, as a philosophical discipline that deals 
directly with science, revealed that science could function well 
without having an objective or regulatory principle of truth. So 
philosophy of science just removing the conceptual obstacles 
(that the fact is not pure, that there is no fact-value dichotomy 
etc.), paved the way for the advent of a post-truth viewpoint. In 
conclusion, will be laid the idea, based on the perspective 
outlined here, that philosophy and especially philosophy of 
science, both, but especially the last one, without any 
predetermined purpose, is a natural contributor to the creation 
of the conditions for the emergence of post-truth. 
  
Post-truth and its meaning 
 
There is no theorist who has embraced the post-truth point of 
view and has come up with some elaboration to date, so to 
outline it somehow has to be based on different sources and the 
scattered thoughts. The genealogy of the post-truth concept is yet 
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only a historical aspect3, but what matters here is the fact that it 
is manifested as a point of view and as an approach.4 
It seems like Matthew Norman, a columnist at London's "The 
Independent", will be right in the assertion that "... we’ve entered 
a post-truth world – there’s no going back now." 5 It should be 
recognized that Norman had hit correctly: the world has entered 
the age of post-truth and there is no return. We are already 
living, since 2016, in a world where post-truth is increasingly 
spreading as a viewpoint and as an approach. This is a 
development that is going on and will continue its own 
trajectory, generating amusing reactions but also exerting its 
own influence. 
To show the true nature of post-truth as a view and approach, 
Norman brought insights from a satire of Baldwin6. Since Trump 
                                                     
3 ”Post-truth seems to have been first used in this meaning in a 1992 essay by 
playwright Steve Tesich in The Nation magazine. Reflecting on the Iran-Contra 
scandal and the Persian Gulf War, Tesich lamented that ‘we, as a free people, 
have freely decided that we want to live in some post-truth world’. There is 
evidence of the phrase ‘post-truth’ being used before Tesich’s article, but 
apparently with the transparent meaning ‘after the truth was known’, and not 
with the new implication that truth itself has become irrelevant. A book, The 
Post-truth Era, by Ralph Keyes appeared in 2004...” at https://en.oxforddictio 
naries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016, seen on November 20 
2017. 
4 The Oxford Dictionaries have declared the post-truth as the word of year 
2016, since its use compared with the previous year has increased by 2000%. 
The main source of its spread was politics, also post-truth in politics, and this 
was linked to the "EU referendum in the UK and the US presidential election" 
in 2016. Look at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-
of-the-year-2016, seen on November 20 2017. 
5 Matthew Norman, “Whoever wins the US presidential election, we’ve 
entered a post-truth  world – there’s no going back now”, “The Indipendent”, 
november 8, 2016, at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/us-election-
2016-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-who-wins-post-truth-world-no-going-
back-a7404826.html, seen on November 20, 2017. 
6Alexander Rae Bolwind in the role of Donald Trump, Kate McKinnon in the role of 
Hillary Clinton, and Cecily Strong in the role of Erin Burnett, on her news show 
OutFront on CNN. For more see Dennis Perkins, "At the end of an ugly campaign, 
Trump and Clinton of SNL go into a sense of well-being", November 6, 2016, at  
https://news.avclub.com/at-the-end-of-an-ugly-campaign-snl-s-trump-and-clinton-
1798253954, seen on November 20, 2017. 
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perceived like Burnett was defending Hillary Clinton, he says, 
"Why are you defending her, Erin? ... I’ve heard from a lot of 
people that you’re lezzing her?" Erin says “That - doesn’t even 
make sense." Trump adds, “It doesn’t matter, Erin, because I said 
it. And now half the country believes it". Norman's conclusion is 
that "The truth has become so devalued that what was once the 
gold standard of political debate is a worthless currency.7 
American comedian Stephen Colbert, in 2005, popularized an 
informal word relating to the same concept: truthiness. This word 
was defined by Oxford Dictionaries as ‘the quality of seeming or 
being felt to be true, even if not necessarily true’. Post-
truth extends that notion from an isolated quality of particular 
assertions to a general characteristic of our age.8 Matthew 
Norman writes: “A few weeks ago when a friend repeated the 
old canard about Hillary being terminally ill, I prissily pointed 
out that this was simply not objectively true. “I don’t give a toss 
about objective truth,” he said with what might serve as the 
heraldic motto for the age. “Everyone’s free to choose their own 
truth.”9  
As a viewpoint post-truth expresses a state which is no longer 
characterized by its basic word (the truth). The basic word is no 
longer characteristic and does not have the weight it has once as 
a purpose to find what matches the reality. The approach 
focused solely on the viewpoint of its basic word, its basic 
concept, seems to have become insufficient to express the whole 
of what is claimed. Perception is no more generated exclusively 
from the basic word, but from many other elements, factors, 
circumstances, motives, feelings, experiences and the like. 
Although such tendencies have been expressed throughout the 
history of mankind, but by becoming a public way of 
                                                     
7 Matthew Norman, quoted article.  
8 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-
2016, seen on November 20, 2017. 
9 Norman, quoted article. 
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communication in countries (like USA and Great Britain) where 
freedom of speech was believed to be based on truth as a pivot 
and as a reference to judgment and assessment, the post-truth 
approach is a phenomenon which shows that public opinion, the 
citizen, is perverted in his interest in the truth and that besides it 
are set other aspects that seem to have importance, such as 
feeling, experiencing, interest, experience, individual belief, 
personal perception and so on. The XXI century seems to turn up 
with this new course of approach and reflection. 
A pretty clear understanding of Oxford Dictionaries: “The 
compound word post-truth exemplifies an expansion in the 
meaning of the prefix post-truth that has become increasingly 
prominent in recent years. Rather than simply referring to the 
time after a specified situation or event – as in post-war or post-
match – the prefix in post-truth has a meaning more like 
‘belonging to a time in which the specified concept has become 
unimportant or irrelevant’. This nuance seems to have originated 
in the mid-20th century, in formations such as post-
national (1945) and post-racial (1971)”.10 
But the prefix post is not a determinant, but it gives you an 
idea of a state. It does not define that state; it shows just it is no 
longer the state of the former, that it is a new state but not yet 
more precisely defined. So it maintains the traces of the 
overcome state, the color of the viewpoint that has already been 
shifted, indicating that it is not trendy anymore, is no longer 
valid, at least not as it used to be, but that has not yet been 
achieved in another, new, different state. 
Matthew Norman discloses a possible reality to be kept in 
mind: “Inhabitants of internet-created bubbles, where 
algorithms feed their prejudices and misconceptions with 
cosseting confirmations of whatever they have selected fir their 
                                                     
10 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-
2016, seen on November 20, 2017. 
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besoke truth, are axiomatically beyond the reach of fact.” He 
continues: “The conditions ...to capitalise on the relegation of 
objective truth to a quaint but irrelevant electoral artefact will 
survive him” because “Trump is not the originator of a frantic 
desire to flee reality. He is its manifestation. 11 
The essence of the post-truth point of view thus can be 
expressed by the fact that it is “relating to or denoting 
circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in 
shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal 
belief”12. This conception may be a trend of our time, but it is not 
a totally unknown spirit, since in the history of thought similar 
trends have been manifested from time to time through the 
centuries not only in politics but also in philosophy, and 
especially during the 20th century in the philosophy of science 
that would have had an impact, though indirectly, on the 
emergence of post-truth, which could even be a source of it, 
interesting to be explored. 
 
The disputable propensity of philosophy 
 
The lexicographic meaning of the term philosophy is "love of 
knowledge," knowledge is considered what is true; ergo 
philosophy was conceived as true love, true knowledge, and not 
all possible knowledge. True knowledge, which philosophy 
aimed to achieve, relied on a stable state, in existing phenomena, 
consistent relationships, and in events that took place, just as 
they did. What characterizes philosophy unlike other disciplines 
of knowledge was that it did not require specific knowledge, but 
wreaths of knowledge that went beyond concrete knowledge, 
seeking and finding (possibly) general principles universally 
applicable and without any exception, and that different 
                                                     
11 Norman, quoted article.  
12 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-
2016, seen on November 20, 2017. 
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philosophical theories were "self-sustained"13 in the sense that 
they did not rely on any authority, but on the consistency of its 
the arguments and the views put forward. 
Despite this (that philosophy was the love of knowledge), it 
had the other side of the coin. From the beginning to the present 
day, philosophy has manifested the propensity of disputability 
as an inclination to disagree with the existing theories, no matter 
how true they seemed to be and despite the authority of the 
author. Philosophy has always been notable by constant search, 
starting from marked achievements to go further, to excavate 
here and there, criticizing, and attacking with arguments and 
counter-arguments the point of views that have claimed the 
truth, until being refuted because of their instability and serious 
defects against what they claimed.  These critics themselves or 
others have put forward an alternative point of views, which, 
having dominated for a while, suffered the fate of their 
ancestors.14 This is the path of the development of philosophy 
over the centuries: disputing, criticizing and going further; so for 
example did Plato (427-347 BC) against Socrates (470-399 BC), 
Aristotle (384-322 BC) versus Plato; Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
versus René Descartes (1596-1650); August Comte (1798-1857) 
versus Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), 
David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant, George Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) etc. 
All this kind of development in philosophy, seen from the 
standpoint of the examination here, show that the philosophers 
themselves would attempt with all their power to collapse those 
truths that their colleagues had put forward, indicating their 
                                                     
13 Hajdin Abazi, The Collapse of Olympus. The fall of the gods – the rise of the 
mankind. (Philosophical Esayys on the Liberation from the Old Worldview). Olymp, 
Pristine, 2016, p. 356. It will be cited shortly: Hajdin Abazi, The Collapse of 
Olympus. 
14 For a review of such development, see Hajdin Abazi, The investigation of 
rationalism in philosophy of science, Zef Serembe, Pristine, 2014, pp. 279-309, 339-
382, 413-422. 
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instability, and by formulating owns theories with the same 
claim for objective or secure truth. This propensity has been 
manifested in philosophy since its origin in Greek antiquity. For 
example, Thales (about 620-546 BC) had formulated a point of 
view of the world by taking water as the primordial (arché) 
substance through which he provided an apparently consistent 
and well-grounded explanation, that’s why the disciples among 
them Anaximander (about 610-546 BC) and Anaximenes (about 
585-528 BC) embraced his point of view as expressing the truth 
about the world. The same disciples by critically reflecting later 
will discern shortcomings in Thales's explanation, and they 
refute it and gave their alternative theories of the world's 
explanation: Anaximander with the doctrine of apeiron and 
Anaximenes with the doctrine of air. 15 
Like Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes as well as other 
philosophers such as Pythagoras (about 570-495 BC), 
Parmenides (late sixth-middle of the 5th century BC) etc., 
believed that there was an objective, certain truth, that could be 
known. All of them trust at that and that’s why they tried to find 
it and then tell to others through theoretical articulation. The 
belief that there is a secure, universal, and everlasting truth is 
perhaps inherited, embedded in religious beliefs. Instead of the 
deities, it was searched for a relationship, a state or a kind of 
objective, respectively permanent existence. This embedded 
outlook as far as it is known, besides Homer and Hesiod the two 
most ancient Greek poets, first who shaken it was the 
philosopher of Greek antiquity, Xenophanes (about 570-478 BC). 
He wrote: "The certain truth, no one has known, / Neither will 
know ... "16. This postulate has, without doubt, stunned the 
foundations of the philosophy of that time, because it 
                                                     
15 For the echo of the importance of Tales' viewpoint and its overcoming of his 
disciples, look at Hajdin Abazi, The Collapse of Olympus, pp. 207-359. 
16 Hajdin Abazi, The Collapse of Olympus, pp, f. 361-481; qouted from p. 382. 
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undermined the bases upon which its trust on the truth was 
established and enjoyed a supreme, certain, objective authority. 
Yet another philosopher with the name of antiquity, 
Heraclitus (535-475 BC), in this spirit, had claimed that it is not 
in the nature or character of the man to possess the true 
knowledge17. "Heraclitus says everything moves, Socrates 
asserts in the Cratylus dialogue, and nothing resides, and he 
resembles existence with a flowing river and says" twice you 
cannot go in the same river."18 According to this doctrine of 
permanent change, the change which made everything fluid, it 
seems natural that man does not has to claim any knowledge to 
be called true. Plato will try to formulate another objective 
existence- ideas as true realities and perceptual reality as its 
reflection (e.g. cave allegory19); but he revealed shortcomings in 
his theory which expressed as self-reflection in Parmenides' 
dialogue20, dealing the difficulties of linking the singular of the 
objective idea to the plurality of its reference in the perceptive 
world. 
As a consequence of these intellectual developments in which 
unintentionally but by its snooper nature led the philosophy to 
the emergence of an extreme point of views like the thesis of the 
non-existence of Gorgias (about 483- circa 375 BC), who went so 
far as to assert that nothing exists, and if yes - it cannot be 
recognized, and if that happens it cannot be communicated21. 
Then Protagoras (490-420 BC), which measure of all things, 
certainly including the knowledge of the truth, found in man, as 
                                                     
17 Qouted according to Popper - Collected Works (Albanian translation) (ed.) 
David Miller, p. 29. 
18 Platon, Kratylos, Skrifter, Bok 2, p. 406. 
19 Platon, Staten. Skrifter. Bok 3, Atlantis, Stockholm, 2013, pp. 293-302. 
20 Plato, Parmenides. Skrifter, Bok 4, Atlantis, Stockholm, 2006, especially pp. 
54-67. 
21 Gorgias well-known assertion is: i) Nothing exists; ii) Even if existence exists, it 
cannot be known; iii) Even if it could be known, it cannot be communicated For more 
see Colin Francis Higgins “Gorgias (483—375 B.C.E.)” at 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/gorgias/, seen on December 2, 2017. 
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an individual: "Man is the measure of all things: of things which 
are, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not."22 
Plato, through Socrates, has given Protagoras the right that if it 
is to rely on perceptions the truth is just as everyone experiences 
it23. 
Over the centuries one of the most widespread points of views 
among philosophers had been the belief that the truth had an 
independent, objective existence. The ancient Greeks believed 
that this truth could be caught only by the mind, the reason. 
George Berkeley (1685-1753), in the Three Dialogues, in the first 
dialogue between Philonous and Hylas, examines the 
relationship between existence and perception, with a few 
nuances of Protagoras, reaching what is a well-known saying: 
esse est percipi (being is to be perceived), meaning the existence 
exists only when it is perceived24. In other words, this meant that 
if it is not perceived by anybody, then nothing existed, not even 
the truth (god here appears as perceptive and consequently that 
makes existence possible). This trend led further Devid Hume, 
who would give the first place the passion compared to the 
reason, pointing out the superiority of the former: ” Reason is 
and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never 
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."25. Such 
assertions, no doubt, will have brought remarkable concuss to 
the existing philosophical concepts, a kind of collapse of what 
was considered the opposite, also the perceptions and passions 
were secondary to the reason which was primary. These points 
of view, at the very least, had brought about a rough overture 
with what appears to be the goal of reaching the viewpoint of 
                                                     
22 Platoni, Thaeitetos, Skrifter, Bok 2, Atlantis, Stockholm, 2001, pp. 150, 164, 
173. 
23 For more, see Hajdin Abazi, The Collapse of Olympus, pp. 508-509, 510-527. 
24 George Berkeley, Principle of Human Knowledge, Three Dialogeus, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 107-147. 
25 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), Book 2, Part 3, section 
3, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1896, f. 283.  
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post-truth. The emphasis on perceiving as a source of existence 
from Berkeley and emphasizing the emotions and perceptions of 
Hume as the basis of knowledge were arguments that it was not 
the only reason but also others sources of knowledge that had to 
be taken into account, if not more, at least as much as reason. 
 
The breakdown of trust in truth as an indicator of the 
progress of science 
 
Philosophy had finally, through Immanuel Kant, brought 
together the two philosophical directions, that of rationalism and 
empiricism, unifying both approaches. Given the ascertainment 
that "reason cannot perceive and sense cannot think", Kant 
claims that "without content thoughts are empty, and 
perceptions without concepts are blind", so the alternative is 
their unity: "Knowledge, expressed Kant, begins only when these 
two abilities [reason and perception] unite.” 26 Further, it is 
Auguste Comte who, by disguising metaphysics from 
philosophy, elevated rationality to the highest stage of 
intellectual development:" liberated reason” has entered into the 
"final phase of positive rationality".27 
With this heritage, the first decades of the twentieth century 
will bring the constitution of the philosophy of science as a 
separate discipline, by the followers of Comte's positivism as 
well as by Ernst Mach’ (1838-1916), and Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(1889- 1951), gathered in the Vienna Circle, known as logical 
positivists28. By condensing the positive achievements of science 
and philosophy, the logical positivists will constitute an 
                                                     
26 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (Albanian translation), Libri 
Shkollor, Pristine, 2002, p. 68. 
27 Auguste Comte, Om positivismen, Bokförlaget Korpen, MINAB, Surtre, 
Sweden, 1979, p. 14. 
28 Some of most prominent names are Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Otto 
Neurath (1882-1945), Hans Hahn (1879-1934), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), 
Alfred Ayer (1910-1989) etc. 
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approach known as verificationism, which "expresses a 
theoretical viewpoint ... the essence of which is the conviction 
that the purpose of [scientific] research is the verification of 
theories”29, that only the assertions that can be empirically 
verified, also through the senses, are cognitively meaningful and 
create possibilities for ascertaining their verity. In other words, 
scientific theories are verified if the reference to their prediction 
is ascertained through observation. The success of science was 
measured by the number of verified assertions, that is, with the 
discovered truths. It seemed that the viewpoint of the logical 
positivists had reaffirmed and revived in the worldview the 
long-standing belief that truth could be achieved, this time 
through various sciences - and this was apparently an 
indispensable indicator while science continues to this day 
makes wonderful discoveries, previously unknown. 
As to fade triumphal exaltation, at the time of bloom and 
broadness of the viewpoint of the logical positivists, appeared an 
opposed theory: the falsificationism of Karl Popper (1902-1994) 
expressed in the Logic of Scientific Disclosure, in 1935. Popper 
claimed not only something contrary to the theory of 
verificationism but also quite unusual, especially considering 
that science was on the march with its achievements: that the 
progress of science was made through the falsification of 
scientific theories that were held for the truth. This was a reversal 
of the belief. 
Popper claimed that a theory was scientific only if it was 
testable and contained potential falsifiers such as basic 
statements30; namely that each scientific theory excludes some 
                                                     
29 Hajdin Abazi, Has Science Got Any Basic Principle? On the developments in the 
philosophy of science abort the scientific progress, Lambert Academic Publishing, 
Balti, 2017, p. 12. 
30 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge Classics. London 
and New York, 2003, p. 19. 
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events, which stood as potential falsifiers31. Any of them could 
falsify the theory. Scientific theories cannot be verified, but they 
could be falsified. This should have been so, since, as the history 
of science witnessed, every scientific theory, which some for 
centuries was believed to be true, was shown in the end to be 
false; therefore, Popper's intent was that as soon as possible 
succeed to falsify a theory that seems true, the science progressed 
faster. The whole transformation into science through 
falsification, according to Popper, was made to come nearly the 
truth, but without ever achieving it. 
What a logical positivist considered being a mistake or a 
fruitless work when a theory was proven to be false; Popper 
considered it as the greatest potential success of science32. With 
the unmatched intellectual courage, Popper overturned the 
dominant conviction that science progressed through knowing 
the truth, and instead showed that true, genuine success and real 
progress is made exactly when a theory casts off after being 
shown by the facts that it is false. Its place, to accomplish the 
mission, must, of course, be taken by another theory that has 
resisted trials of falsifying, but one day would inevitably suffer 
the same fate as its predecessor. As soon as this happens the 
science would progress faster – that’s why precisely the 
scientists’ activity had to be characterized by attempts to falsify 
each of the dominant scientific theories. Popper's great merit is 
that he not only legitimized the falsification as valid but 
succeeded too in arguing that for such reasons the rejection of an 
old theory and its replacement with a new one were the way of 
development and progress of science, as well as of human 
knowledge. 
The task of sciences from the beginning was considered as the 
disciplines they had for mission to discover the truth and that the 
                                                     
31 Popper, ibid., pp. 66-67. 
32 Hajdin Abazi, Has Science Got Any Basic Principle? p. 17. 
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activity of scientists was famous precisely through their 
discoveries with which new knowledge was formed. But Popper 
changed this course and opened another perspective where the 
attainment of the truth had been eliminated and its place was 
settled by scientific research with the objective of falsifying the 
scientific theories that claimed the truth - through which the 
change of various sciences throughout history was well 
explained. Expressed in the spirit of the topic here, it can be said 
that scientists’ research to verify theories became devalued and 
scientists' effort to falsify them become valuable. The approach 
was overturned. The greatest transformations in science were 
related to the research attempts achieving the falsification; it was 
not the verification but the falsification that stand as the 
foundation to the scientific revolution, as the decisive turning 
points of progress. So, it was Popper who undermined the 
authority of truth in the philosophy of science and advocated for 
counter-equivalence of falsification. What's most interesting 
about Popper's approach is that he did not deny the truth; on the 
contrary, he regarded it, somewhat like Kant, as "regulative 
principle", being in reality unattainable. 'Eureka' was the 
discovery of counter-facts that showed a scientific theory to be 
false. 
 
Science works alike even without the truth 
 
The overthrow Karl Popper caused by the falsificationism 
philosophy of science was a response to the great question of 
how the fundamental turning points in the development of 
science took place throughout history. Popper had come to argue 
that decisive for the progress of science was the falsification of a 
theory and not its veracity. There was no denial of the existence 
of the truth, but it was shifted away as not capable to be 
determinative of intense scientific transformations - such could 
be the opposite, and this seemed to be an overthrow of what 
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seemed logical, right, proper, and it may appear as the most 
destructive viewpoint in the philosophy of science, dispelling 
what should be the epicenter of developments and doing it an 
approach that overturned the scientific research. It should be 
kept in mind that falsificationism was not nihilism; it was an 
approach with precise criteria as for how to reach the 
falsification, which was not easy but rather difficult and complex 
enterprise according to the concept of Popper. Falsificationism 
showed there was not a single approach to science, that, in fact, 
there were other possibilities of approaches and explanation, and 
it enriched the resonance of philosophy of science on science. 
In any case, it seems that unintentionally Popper had opened 
the "box of Pandora". Another philosopher of science would 
postulate that science can work well even without the concept of 
truth; like Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend as well as Hilary 
Putnam. 
The biggest push in this direction, with no doubt, made 
Thomas Kuhn in his masterpiece The Structure of Scientific 
Revolution (1962). Kuhn asserted, contrary to Popper, that "we 
have to give up the notion, whether explicit or implicit, that 
paradigm changes are offered by scientists and those who learn 
from them, closer to the truth."33 This means, according to Kuhn, 
that science is not intended to offer any pre-determined purpose, 
including the truth. The scientific research he conceived as an 
effort to bring nature, or any part of it, to the mold of paradigm, 
so that the facts are reconciled with theory. Kuhn also states more 
clearly that the sciences can be developed "without the help of 
any set goals, to attain a genuine science embedded once and for 
all."34 For Kuhn, "the development of science, similar to 
                                                     
33Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Albanian translation), 
Dukagjini, Tiranë-Pejë, 1997, p. 234. 
34 Kuhn, ibid., p. 237 
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biological evolution, is one-way and irreversible,"35 and in 
analogy with the evolutionary concept, he points out that conflict 
between community members to find solutions to the faced 
problems is the best way in the exercise of science, and this leads 
to its future36. Clearly, as I have said elsewhere, Kuhn submits 
his viewpoint that science does not need to be based on the 
notion of truth and that it is not its purpose of achieving any 
truth.37 
Paul Feyerabend has criticized Kuhn that he, removing the 
purpose of truth38 as a preoccupation and objective of scientific 
research, has stripped science of its essence. But at the same time, 
he himself offers an anarchistic philosophy of science, according 
to which each theory can be held by each group of scientists, and 
the very fact that a group supports and trusts it, it is fair and 
legitimate for them. Feyerabend does not offer any way to 
distinguish the veracity of different theories, even when they 
may be of the same discipline and contradict each other. 
Feyerabend's assertion that science is the path to knowing truth 
and reality39 remains an ornament that has no weight at all, since 
not only the various and contradictory theories are considered 
legitimate if a group of scientists holds them but, moreover, even 
the various spells like woodoo are equivalent to science. If it is 
clearly seen, the anarchist attitude of Feyerabend is the greatest 
undermining of truth, until there is no way how to distinguish 
                                                     
35 Kuhn in Laktos & Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 
Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, 
London, 1965, Cambridge University Press, London, 1970, p. 246. 
36 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Albanian translation), pp. 235-
236. 
37 Hajdin Abazi, The investigation of rationalism in philosophy of science, (in 
Albanian), p. 196. 
38 Paul Feyerabend, “Consolations for the Specialist”, në Lakatos & Musgrave, 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Proceedings of the International 
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965, Cambridge 
University Press, London, 1970, p. 201. 
39 Feyerabend, Mot Metodtvång – Utkast till en anarkistisk vetenskapsteori. 
Arkiv modena klassiker, 2000, p. 8. 
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and recognize it, which means that each may seem true without 
being at all 
Being Popper's follower, Imre Lakatos could not advocate the 
truth; instead, as a middle way, he postulated that the progress 
of science is measured by the discovery of new theories and new 
facts40. This sounds similar to what Kuhn calls puzzle-solving, 
which implies calibration of facts with theory and vice versa. 
Hilary Putnam, however, persuasively argued the collapse of 
fact/value dichotomy41, showing, in accordance with Kuhn, 
Feyerabend and Lakatos, that they are in fact intertwined and 
undivided between themselves, which actually collapses what is 
known as objectivity, since if the facts are not independent of the 
values (theories) then they are not objective. Thus, in a way, the 
pillar reference of the fact as an objective and independent 
existence is theoretically undermined. 
 
The paleness of reliance on the truth authority 
 
The twentieth century’s philosophy of science resulted in the 
paleness of any support of what was known as objective. The 
logical positivists believed that the facts were data, meaning that 
they were pure, that is, they were not influenced by theories42, 
and that is why they believed facts could be faced with the 
reference of various theories as a stone of proof to judge whether 
or not they were true. And if the facts were pure, then they would 
serve as verity references. 
                                                     
40 Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Research Scientific 
Programmes” in Lakatos & Musgrave (ed), Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, 
Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, 
London, 1965, Cambridge University Press, London, 1970, pp. 118, 155-157, 
170, 175. 
41 Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and other essays, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London2002, p. 1-8, 
44, 137.  
42 Alfred Ayer, Logical positivism, The Free Press, Nwe York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1959, pp.18-19, 144. 
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But Popper, the contemporary of logical positivists, argued 
that experience is influenced by theoretical viewpoints and that 
the facts are not as pure as the logical positivists believed. 
Thomas Kuhn went even further when he points out that our 
concepts (e.g. paradigm, tradition, worldview, metaphysical 
credence, etc.) tell us what entities the universe contains43 which 
then scientists do research to find them. In this spirit, Feyerabend 
showed how the embedded theories affect the perceptions of 
scientists, which impede them from expounding the new facts as 
well as realities that were different from those cultivated by 
tradition44. In other words, Popper, Kuhn, and Feyerabend 
argued that our observations, perceptions of the facts, are 
influenced, if not determined, by the theories. 
 The last blow in this direction was given by Hilary Putnam. 
Putnam showed that there was no real separation between facts 
and values (viewpoints, beliefs, theories) that they were 
intertwined and interdependent45. What will be considered the 
fact, indeed, depends on the values the scientists or groups of 
scientists have accepted and operates with them. Objective, or 
true, can also be considered something only if the values give it 
such an attribute; but contrary to these values - facts, as well as 
truth, are accepted neither as facts nor as truth. 
In such a state when the philosophy of science has broken the 
foundations so far trustworthy, and while there is no other 
theory that has overcome and provided an alternative, there is 
no need to look absurd either the ‘alternative fact’ or the fake 
news, as well as ‘alt-right’46 etc. These, as well as others which 
may flourish, appear to be the fruit of the vacuum that has 
                                                     
43 Kuhn, The structure of Scientific Revolutions (Albanian translation), p. 24. 
44 Paul Feyerabend, Mot Metodtvång, p. 50. He says that facts” are compound 
by old ideologies”. 
45 Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and ther essays, pp. 1-
8, 44, 137.  
46 ‘Alt-right’ (alternative rights) see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-
of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016, seen on December 3, 2017. 
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From what has been said here, though in thick lines and well-
known things but posed in the context of post-truth, it seems 
quite natural the emergence of new approaches: above 
developments in philosophy led to the collapse of the authority 
of the truth. Different philosopher and philosopher of science 
indicated that truth, facts, and human observations are 
impregnated with, if not determined by, theoretical point of 
views. That is to say, facts that are considered objective have 
been argued to be intertwined with values, and only when they 
are compatible then facts become facts, otherwise not. 
Philosophy of science showed that science even without being 
guided by the concept of truth, without the objective of knowing 
the truth can function in alike, in the sense that scientists can do 
their research. This does not seem as strange after it has been 
argued that the facts are not only impregnated by the theory but 
also the dichotomy between fact and theory / value does not 
exist as it was believed, that, indeed they are dependent and 
conditioned with each other. 
In the end, having in mind that in this discussion no attention 
has been paid to the general social and technological 
developments have also had its powerful influence on the 
emergence of post-truth, however it can be asserted that if the 
philosophy of science provided historical data that theories of 
science are false, that the facts are not objective and independent 
as believed, that facts are not separated from the values, that 
science can achieve knowledge even without being guided by 
the truth. If so, then unintentionally philosophy of science has 
created the philosophical conditions, also the needed spirit and 
climate, and has paved the way for the emergence of a post-truth 
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concept. This background of the philosophy of science and its 
impact seems to shed light on the emergence of post-truth as the 
approach and as a point of view as a natural fruit of intellectual 
development.  Here is not explicated if this approach and this 
point of views are right or not, it will be determined by future 
intellectual developments if they will bring any response that 
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